Demokratske vrednosti, emocije i emotivizam by Vranić, Bojan & Vranić, Bojan
FILOZOFIJA I DRUŠTVO XXVII (4), 2016.
723
Bojan Vranić
Democratic Values, Emotions and Emotivism 
Abstract The aim of this paper is to explore the relation between democratic 
values and emotions. The author argues that democratic values and emotional 
judgments are inter-reducible: political agents use emotional judgments to re-
flexively evaluate normative paradigms of political life. In the first part of the 
paper, the author describes the state of emotions in contemporary political 
philosophy and identifies Charles Stevenson’s ethical conception of emotivism 
as the first comprehensive attempt to neutrally conceptualize emotions in mor-
al and political thinking. The second part of the paper explores the shortcomings 
of emotivism and finds an adequate alternative in Martha Nussbaum’s concept 
of emotional judgment as the one that contains beliefs and values about social 
objects. In the final part of the paper, the author identifies that moral and polit-
ical disagreements emerge in democracies from ranking of the importance of 
political objects. The evaluation criteria for this type of ranking is derived from 
democratic values which are reducible to agents’ emotional judgments. 
Keywords: democracy, emotivism, emotional judgments, moral disagreement 
Introduction
After losing the 2013 elections in Australia, former labor prime minister 
Julia Gillard published an article in The Guardian, in which she analyzed 
the election defeat.1 There is an intriguing message in the heart of this text: 
when a politician loses political power, it feels like an emotional upheaval 
of her or his world (Gillard, Internet). In the aftermath of the defeat, Gil-
lard (Internet) remembers that she had “waves of sensations” that mani-
fested themselves “like a pain that hits you like a fist, pain so strong you 
feel it in your guts, your nerve endings.” The situation was similar in the 
labor election camp where one could talk only about “the guilt” (Gillard, 
Internet) and that she felt that her colleagues shared this upheaval feeling 
with her. Gillard concludes the text with a notion of hope that from collec-
tive “grieving” there should spring a new “purpose” of the labor party: “To 
protect those who need us to shield them. To empower through opportu-
nity. To decide what future we want for all our nation’s children and then 
build it” (Gillard, Internet).
1  The paper is a part of research project no. 179076, funded by Ministry of education, 
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How should a political philosopher understand Gillard’s message and its 
normative content? To answer this, a political philosopher should take 
into consideration at least two additional question: (1) Why does Gillard 
describe the feeling of the loss of power as emotional upheaval and (2) 
what specific emotions form a cluster of that upheaval? If one looks at the 
mainstream theories of contemporary political philosophy, it is particular-
ly worrying how empty the basket of analytical tools that can be used for 
understanding emotionally upheaval situations in political life is. Even if 
one manages to acquire such a tool, it is usually used for describing the 
behavior triggered by emotions. As Robert Solomon (1976: 129) argued, 
emotions (or passions) in social thought are usually taken for an irrational 
part of human nature which leads to suffering and inactivity. 
However, it is encouraging that in the last several decades, philosophers 
(Solomon 1976; Nussbaum 2004; Gilbert 2014; Freeden 2014) started to 
question this dominant paradigm about emotions. The hypothesis that ap-
pears in various forms in their works can be summarized in the following 
question: do our emotions have a structure of a judgment? If we return 
for a moment to Gillard’s quest for a new purpose for the Australian labor 
party, that quest might have emerged from her emotional state, but it can-
not be inferred from this state that such a quest is irrational. To set new 
political ends when a politician loses an election is a rational move. In Gil-
lard’s case, that move was derived from an emotional judgment, the one 
that she describes as collective grieving.
Mainstream political philosophers often ignore the emotional state of po-
litical actors and deduce rational behavior from impartial principles that 
are, per definitionem, deprived of subjectivity. One of the best critiques of 
the current state in political philosophy comes from ethics: 
“In ethics, for example, moral knowledge has become equated with the 
elaboration of highly formalized and stylized decision procedures, with 
extremely general ‘first principles,’ and with manipulating the logical im-
plications of hypothetical cases whose occurrence in daily life is either 
impossible or improbable. The result is the production of a kind of knowl-
edge that has no valence, that does not speak to human needs, fears, and 
aspirations, and thus cannot attract the assent of the biographical self, 
but only a kind of purely logical assent. The further result may be, as An-
nette Baier claims, that the morality endorsed by many moral theorists 
‘is seriously endorsed only in their studies, not in the moral education 
they give their children, nor in their reflective attitude to their own past 
moral education, nor even in their attitude to how they teach their own 
courses in moral philosophy’” (Calhoun 2004: 112). 
In this paper, I want to explore the relationship between emotions and dem-
ocratic values. Democracy is a suitable subject for this kind of exploration 
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because it is a political arena where participants are in permanent con-
test over the meaning of values. I argue that political agents use emotion-
al judgments to reflexively evaluate the normative paradigms of political 
life. Consequently, values as a traditional means of evaluating of political 
systems (primarily in political science but also in political philosophy) are 
reducible to emotional judgments. By explicating this reduction, I hope to 
shed new light on the role of emotion in political philosophy.
In the first part of the paper I will briefly analyze contemporary context 
and explain the lack of usage of the concept of emotions in political phi-
losophy. I turn then to the first major attempt to solve this problem found 
in Stevenson’s ethical conception of emotivism. In the second part of the 
paper I analyze the thesis of Robert Solomon who argues that emotions are 
purely subjective emotional judgments and Martha Nussbaum’s account 
that emotional judgments are closely related to the values of a society. I 
conclude the paper with a description of the nature of the relation between 
emotional judgments and values.
Political philosophy, impartiality and emotivism 
The conflict between political philosophers who find that passions are an 
indiscernible part of politics and those who want to liberate political con-
cepts from irrationalities reached its peak in the mid XX century. The crit-
ics of classical ethical and political thought of that period strongly argued 
against the normative dimension of moral judgments: in the best case sce-
nario, the strength of moral judgments is in their emotional appeal. 
This conflict turned into warfare between moral cognitivists and anti-cogni-
tivist (Stojanovic 1968). Albeit cognitivist ethics won in this conflict, there 
were severe casualties, especially in the field of political philosophy. This 
is why the passion is dispelled from contemporary political philosophy, es-
tablishing the monopoly of the ratio that is supported by a new political 
science paradigm taken from economics. In a recently published text, Jon 
Elster (2004: 160) argues that the problem of passions and emotions lies in 
the probability calculus of political actions or inactions, i.e. that emotions 
need to be calculated two times in the account: firstly, as a variable that is 
dependent on an actor’s motives and secondly as an ex-ante variable. Put 
differently, to take emotions into account in political behavior is to disre-
gard the principle of elegancy of a theory, i.e. the requirement that theses 
of a scientific theory should remain simple.
This account portrays well the dominant attitude toward emotions in politi-
cal science. The problem with this kind of attitude is taking for granted that 
political behavior is causal. When Julian Gillard (Internet) lost her power as 
Australia’s prime minister, she asked the following question: “Are election 
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victories the only measure of political success? (…) But surely our national 
story is written in more than statistics of election night. Our national story is 
shaped by what endures from the government as well as what is rejected.” 
What follows from Gillard’s assumption is that the measurability of political 
success is rational and economical, but the means that political agents use 
to evaluate political acts are inferred from cultural context. Therefore, one’s 
view of political success consists of rational and emotional components. 
A good way to start a quest to find an analytical means of evaluation in po-
litical context is by exploring the ethical doctrine of emotivism. Although 
it is considered to be vastly misunderstood and anachronistic today (Satris 
1982: 128), Charles Stevenson’s work Ethics and Language is a treasure 
house of analytical tools for analyzing non-rational moral judgments. My 
reason for opting for Stevenson’s work is twofold. Firstly, Stevenson’s anal-
ysis is a good example of how logical analysis can be applied to emotions 
and therefore has an introductory function to the argument for emotion as 
types of judgments. Hector-Neri Castañeda (1967: 671) described Steven-
son’s theory as the one that “combines emotive and cognitive meanings of 
all sorts and fuses subjectivism with most types of objectivist naturalism.” 
Secondly, Stevenson takes a specific moral situation as his subject-matter, 
the one that implies an existence of moral disagreement between agents. 
This type of situation is especially important for democracy, because de-
mocracy represents a social context where moral disagreements are rec-
ognized as a “natural state.” 
Stevenson’s main argument is that moral judgments consist of a recom-
mendation for accepting a behavior P. This recommendation “involves 
something more than a disinterested description, or a cold debate about 
whether it is already approved, or when it is spontaneously going to be” 
(Stevenson 1958: 13). The structure of moral judgment has a rational basis 
(“disinterested description” and a “cold debate”) which Stevenson (1958, 
3) terms as attitudes and defines them as beliefs (that are necessarily con-
nected with objects in the world) which form relations that are verifiable 
or falsifiable. Attitudes provide information about expected behavior and 
serve as truth function to moral judgment, since there cannot be an agree-
ment or disagreement on a non-belief (Stevenson 1958: 12). Therefore, 
this verifiable/falsifiable part of a moral judgment is a weak support for 
moral thinking and it cannot be considered as a sound ground for ethics. 
This is why Stevenson claims that moral judgments need to involve some-
thing more that would have the function of a supporting beam for moral 
behavior. This kind of support Stevenson terms as emotive meaning.2 This 
2  The nature of the concept of emotive meaning is such that it is not reducible to 
rational part of a judgment. Emotive and rational part of a moral judgment support 
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concept is key to understanding why emotivism was the most popular ethi-
cal doctrine in the mid XX century but, more importantly, why it eventually 
failed. Stevenson (1958: 33) defines this concept in the following manner: 
“The emotive meaning of a word is the power that the word acquires, on 
account of its history in emotional situations, to evoke or directly express 
attitudes, as distinct from describing or designating them.” I will analyze 
two parts of the definition which are important for my argument, i.e. accu-
mulation of power and the use of that power. 
I will start with the latter. Stevenson makes a distinction between emotions 
and emotive meaning. Emotion is a subjective and internalized state, which 
is reflected in certain behavior when one is in a certain context (Steven-
son 1958: 39). The use of emotions in this manner is something that the 
subject learns from his or her environment. Stated in this way, Stevenson’s 
theory is significantly distinctive from the James-Lange theory of emotion, 
because it puts emphasis on a socially dependent meaning of emotions. As 
Errol Bedford (1964: 83) argues, the consequence of this “social context” 
dependency is that “statements about emotions cannot be said to describe 
behavior; they interpret it.” That is to say that emotive meaning has a dif-
ferent logic than that which one uses when evaluating attitudes.
I will explicate this view with an example. Suppose that Schrödinger used 
my cat, Steven, for his experiment. The outcome of the experiment as well 
as the paradox that sprang from it are well known. However, for me, as the 
emotionally involved party in this experiment, the question has a different 
emphasis and priority than solving the paradox of quantum mechanics: Is 
it justifiable to use Steven the cat for this kind of experiment? Put differ-
ently, I am using a different kind of logic while evaluating the justifiability 
of the experiment and its results. This becomes clear when reflecting the 
seemingly (or partly) paradoxical moment when Steven the cat was alive 
and dead at the same time. If I were to use rational means to explicate this 
situation, the fact that Steven is my cat would not change the outcome of 
the experiment: it is still a paradox. With emotive meaning, the logic of 
the evaluation changes: my emotion is a cluster3 of joy and sorrow, and 
behavioral reaction is crying over Steven the cat’s fate to be the guinea pig 
for an experiment that involves radioactive substances. Is this an emotion-
al paradox? The answer is certainly negative. Everyone knows at least one 
situation where they were at the same time sad and happy (weddings, di-
vorces, job changing etc.). Emotional meaning is socially dependent and 
therefore has a crucial role in moral disagreement. 
each other. As Stevenson (1958: 80) argues, it is very difficult to find a judgment that 
is only rational or just emotive.
3  This cluster is probably consisted of several more emotions (excitement, horror, 
resistance, etc.), but they do not make a difference to the argument.
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Following this example, it becomes clear that crying (or lack of it) is a 
learned reaction to maltreatment of a living creature (this is even more em-
phasized when there is an emotional relationship with that creature, i.e. 
when the cat is your pet). Although it seems prima facie that it is sufficient 
to assert “x cries; x is witnessing a maltreatment of his pet” to infer “x is 
sad”, it is still not a necessary conclusion. In a given social context, where 
the experiment is inconclusive whether the cat is alive or dead at a cer-
tain moment, the emotional meaning of crying can also be a joyous reac-
tion. Also, if one uses the descriptive method in order to conclusively infer 
the emotive meaning of crying, that wouldn’t be of great help. Stevenson 
(1958: 249) argues that the function of description is only to determine 
whether a behavior is rational or irrational: if the attitudes of a moral agent 
contain some epistemic fallacies, then it is a case of irrational behavior (e.g. 
I believe that Steven the cat is in the box, when in fact the box is empty). 
Irrational behavior is therefore a question for epistemology and not ethics. 
This is connected with the fact that moral disagreements can endure even 
after all epistemic difficulties were removed (e.g. I can keep worrying that 
next time, Steven the cat will indeed die in Schrödinger’s box).
This example demonstrates that Stevenson’s notion of “use of power” of a 
moral word has the function of solving disagreements by changing the logic 
of a situation, from a rational to an emotional one. Emotive meaning is so-
cially and culturally dependent.4 Still, it remains to be explored what does 
it mean that a word has a power which charges it with emotional meaning. 
This can be best explicated by evoking Stevenson’s argument (1958: 60) 
that the meaning of a moral attitude remains solid even after the meaning 
of object that is connected to that attitude had changed. Therefore, the use 
of concept of power in Stevenson’s account fits the notion of disposition. 
The concept of power comprehended as a disposition is not new in eth-
ics. In De Anima, Aristotle (2008: 116, 433a-15) found that emotions (i.e. 
passions or desires) are a significant part of human behavior. However, he 
explicitly used the term disposition when defining the relation between 
passions/desires and the object of passion in book seven of Nicomachean 
Ethics. Aristotle (1980: 37, 1105b-1) argued that this relation is a constant 
that follows one’s behavior when he or she is near the desired object, i.e. 
4  Stevenson only briefly mentions that emotive meaning is learned through social-
ization. He argues that moral judgments are formed through a specific type of practice 
that extends to a lifetime and is also depended from situations in which these judgments 
are stated (Stevenson 1958: 91–92). Only several decades later, the thesis of emotion-
al socialization took its form. For TenHouten (2006: 191), emotional socialization is a 
way for people to emotionally season through lifetime, developing more or less sensi-
tivity towards other people’s attitudes. This led some authors (Baron-Koen 2013) to 
connect certain forms of emotional behavior, such as empathy, to the nature of evil. 
729
DEMOCRACY AND ETHICAL VALUES
in a condition to feel something about that object. Prior to explicating the 
nature of the relationship between disposition and the concept of power, 
it is important to analyze the question whether desire itself is a disposition 
(not only the relation between desire and the desired object)? 
The answer to this question is negative. To state my argument, I will mod-
ify Aristotle’s example from De Anime of a physician and his motivation to 
treat a patient. Aristotle (2008: 116, 433a-5) claimed that physician does 
not treat a patient due to the fact that he is skilled in the art of medicine. 
Formal knowledge of the art is a necessary condition for him to be in a 
social context of practicing medicine, but it is not sufficient. Both neces-
sary and sufficient conditions are met only when the patient is actually in 
front of the physician, i.e. when they are socially interacting. The years of 
training in the art of medicine take the form of the desire to help and cure 
the patient. As Hannah Arendt (1978: 58) argued, in Aristotelian ethic it 
is necessary for the reason to include some kind of “calculation” in order 
to actualize the desire. Arendt (1978: 58) found that this type of calculus 
ethics (exemplified in the notion of phronesis) is deduced from the mean-
ing of the concept of “oregō” which “indicates the stretching out of one’s 
hand to reach for something nearby”, and which Aristotle used as a syn-
onym for a desire (orexis). In the example with the physician, his knowl-
edge does not have the power to heal a patient; this power derives from 
the physician acting. This example shows that acting and disposition are 
synonyms, and disposition and desire are not. 
Aristotelian doctrine is very much present in Stevenson’s theory of emotiv-
ism. The result of Stevenson’s analysis (1958: 73) is an argument for a dis-
tinction between belief (knowledge, practices) and dispositions. The pur-
pose of belief is in applying descriptive meanings of words used in a moral 
judging, while the purpose of dispositions is in evoking learned emotional 
meanings. For Stevenson (1958: 44), there is no equivalence between emo-
tions and dispositions; emotions are reduced to behavioral reactions that 
are more or less morally appropriate in certain social contexts. The moral 
judgments, however, are independent from and irreducible to emotions.
This antireductionism and an escape from naïve subjectivism was the rea-
son for the popularity of Stevenson’s theory in the mid XX century. The 
greatest debates about emotivism were concentrated on the relationship 
between emotion and emotive meaning. The latter does not need to be 
followed by any kind of emotion. The function of emotive meaning is to 
evaluate whether an act and situation are congruent from society’s point 
of view. If not, there need to be changes, whether in an agent’s behavior or 
of social norms. In this sense, emotive meaning is both evaluative and nor-
mative. The twofold function of emotive meaning further dispels subjectiv-
ism but, at the same time, because of the premise of its social dependency, 
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emotivism dismisses universal moral principles and reduces them to so-
cialization of cultural norms. Emotivism is not subjectivism but it has nev-
ertheless been followed by psychological determinism. 
This was the main reason why emotivism eventually declined. I will an-
alyze this problem in detail and try to determine how emotivism can be 
modified to avoid the problem of psychological determinism. The overlap 
of emotive meaning and acting would be a simple process if it weren’t for 
what Stevenson (1958: 90) designates as a consequence of the ambiguity 
of natural language.5 To avoid this kind of ambiguity, Stevenson designs 
a procedure for the formalization of ethical meanings that consists of a 
series of definitions that sharpen the meaning of the word and which he 
terms “the first pattern analysis” (1958: 89). The distinction between for-
mal definitions and everyday usage of the word is purely analytical: the 
meaning is determined by language practices which assert what is good 
and just and what is corrupted and evil. The first pattern analysis serves 
to indicate the historical meaning and changes of the moral word and to 
isolate the emotional surplus of that word. 
This is a useful tool for explicating the social context and emotional his-
tory that is prior to interaction between moral agents. The result of the 
first pattern analysis is twofold: the description of the correct application 
of disposition within a context and a judgment that consists of assertions 
“I approve” or “I disapprove”, which has a special behavioral function to 
arouse the emotive interest of the hearer (Stevenson 1958: 93). If this in-
terest is not evoked, then one of two cases is true: either the word of which 
I approve/disapprove lost its emotional appeal or it has no meaning (the 
object to which it refers no longer exists or the hearer has lost any recol-
lection of it). 
The arousal of emotive interests is not necessarily related to both cognitive 
and affective elements. It is sufficient that only one of them is affected, in 
order to start the communication between moral agents. Castañeda (1967: 
673) argues that this is one of the constitutive elements of the Stevenson’s 
theory and terms it the ethical-core thesis: 
“The characteristically ethical meaning of an expression, to be called its 
ethical core, consists of both the expression’s emotive meaning and the 
expression’s cognitive meaning consisting of its denoting some natural 
property or other. The statemental components F1, . . ., F, may vanish; in 
such a case the ethical meaning of the word in question conforms to the 
5  This relation between moral word and natural language led some moral theorists 
to put emotivism into the basket of moral relativism. As Asher Moore (1958: 377) 
argued, emotivists spent more time in defending from these accusations then devel-
oping their thesis about emotive meaning of moral terms. 
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first pattern of analysis. The autobiographical component may vanish; in 
such a case the ethical meaning of the expression in question conforms 
to the second pattern of analysis” (Castañeda 1967: 673). 
Castañeda’s formalization of the thesis demonstrates well that the func-
tion of the first pattern analysis is the removal of ambiguities that the use 
of a word can lead to, especially when not all of the natural features of the 
object that the word connotes are known. The removal of ambiguities is 
not a morally contested process, because it is done by purely formal rules 
of analysis. What if, however, the “autobiographical components” of an 
agent’s attitude are not communicable? If that is the case, then the analy-
sis of the whole assertion is required in order to find the emotional mean-
ing of the attitude (Castañeda 1967: 673). In this part of the analysis, the 
focus moves from the historical meanings to persuasions. Put differently, 
when the ambiguities are removed, and moral disagreement still persists, 
the only thing that agents can do is to try to persuade each other that the 
moral conception that they are respectively opting for is the best one. This 
is the part of Stevenson’s second pattern of analysis.
Stevenson (1957: 139) argues that persuasion is the ground of delibera-
tion when all rational means for resolving the disagreement are exhausted. 
Persuasion is not irrational, but a non-rational way to settle a moral dis-
agreement. Stevenson (1957: 221) infers that in a moral situation which 
cannot be solved via rational means, one can only apply the lexicographic 
sorting principle on the meaning of moral terms and then evaluate them 
on a ranking scale. This scale is not objective but subjective and for this 
reason, moral terms remain emotionally charged. Evaluation groups mor-
al terms by their “family resemblances” (Stevenson 1957: 221) and ranks 
them by the strength of their emotional appeal.
If one is willing to sacrifice the universality of moral principles, and reduce 
them to social interactions between moral agents and their power to per-
suade one another, Stevenson’s theory is an adequate basis for the analysis 
of moral thinking. When moral agents have accurate descriptions of the 
moral terms that they are using, the moral disagreement is to be settled by 
the agent’s readiness to get emotionally evolved in the matter. This would 
be rational behavior, if Stevenson’s first pattern analysis should achieve 
its purpose. Stevenson’s behavioral definition of emotion is too narrow. 
The problem can be summarized in the following question: if the emotion 
is reduced only to perceivable behavior, and it is not connected to the re-
flection of moral words and concepts, how is the evaluation in the second 
pattern of analysis possible? In order to see “family resemblances”, one 
needs to know the criteria for family grouping, i.e. to be able to concep-
tualize emotions, not just show them. The criteria are blocked by psycho-
logical determinism which is generated by behavioral reduction. Finally, 
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to state that emotional meaning is the criteria for evaluation would be a 
vicious circle, because the disagreement started because of the emotional 
meaning of the attitude. 
I will try to remove the problem of psychological determinism from the 
first pattern analysis by redefining the role of emotions in moral disagree-
ment. I will argue that emotions have an active role in structuring values 
that form the agent’s moral thinking. 
Evaluative function of emotional judgments 
In the previous several decades, philosophers and moral philosophers have 
been exploring the possibility of emotions having a regulative function in 
the life of an individual. The pioneering work in this field was Robert Sol-
omon’s book The Passions (1976). Solomon’s work is also the first major 
break from the traditionally negative relation of philosophy to emotions, 
as well as from once very influential behavioral theory.
Solomon explicated his stand on emotivism only recently and argued that 
the main problem with this ethical doctrine is the removal of rationality 
from emotive judgment (2007: 205). However, this was already implied 
in The Passions, where he stated that agents should strive to comprehend 
the logic of emotions: 
“But it is also true that most emotions are shared in common by all peo-
ple, whatever their differences in languages, customs, religion, etc. The 
logic of the emotions is in no case simply ‘the one’s own’; in every case 
the  logic of emotions, once its parameters are known, is a public affair… 
Logic dictates the course that emotions will take, and that is where we 
expect them to go. Similarly, we criticize our own emotions, in reflections 
or retrospect, for their foolishness and stupidity, for their lack of justifi-
cation and unreasonableness, and such criticism make sense only on the 
basis of an objective logical structure which we expect our emotions to 
follow” (Solomon 1976: 257). 
Solomon’s view is different from Stevenson’s emotivism in at least two 
ways: (1) the emotions are not learned behavioral reactions – they are au-
tonomous in their own logic; (2) the rational and emotional are different 
ways of thinking, both derived from the same objective basis. 
To justify its cause, Solomon (1976, 180) introduced the concept of inten-
tion into his account: “To say that emotions are intentional is to say that 
they essentially have logical connections with the objects of our world… 
Emotions are not ‘mental states’… An emotion is a structure linking our-
selves and the objects of our world which provide the structures of our 
world.” By introducing intentionality into an account about emotions, Sol-
omon puts more emphasis on reflections. Emotions are not just a means of 
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communication; they have an autonomous role in converging a subject’s 
world view with an objective one: “An emotion is a basic judgment about 
our Selves and our place in our world, the projection of the values and 
ideas, structures and mythologies, according to which we live and through 
which we experience our lives” (Solomon 1976: 187).
Solomon’s subjectivism dispels the difference between emotions and emo-
tional meaning and converges them into emotional judgments. For an agent, 
emotions have both structural and semantic roles by giving sense and mean-
ing to the objects in the world.6 However, Solomon modified his original 
account to remove surplus intellectualism from emotions (Solomon 2007: 
204). Solomon later argued that emotional judgments are inherently con-
nected with acting about and not conceptualizing the world. To make this 
clear, Solomon (2007: 206) gave a useful example: Imagine that you are 
strolling down the street. Every step of the way you are making judgment 
about your direction (e.g. should you continue walking or stop by the win-
dow). Do you think about the judgment? No. If you, however, trip and fall, 
and when it comes to a disturbance in the structure of the walking-plan 
that you made, then you will stop, think and evaluate what had happened. 
Put differently, in situations of some sort of crisis, the emotional evaluation 
process increases, while in “normal” condition, thinking and evaluating our 
actions are in a “sleep mode.” 
Solomon’s account is very useful for analyzing emotional judgments in this 
kind of context and it can serve as a good basis for dispelling the problems 
of emotivism. When the theory of emotional judgments is applied to Ste-
venson’s first pattern analysis, it broadens the role of emotions. Historical 
recollections are an important part of an emotional judgment but sill just 
a part. For Solomon (2007: 257), emotional judgments create a network 
between internal moral world of agents and the world around them. The 
concept of network also changes Stevenson’s idea on the use of power (dis-
position). The power of moral agents is a result of their ability to conceptu-
alize a network between their emotions and the social world through acting. 
The concept of emotional judgments is the first step in correcting  emotivism. 
Is it now possible to argue for universality and normativity of moral judg-
ments in the context of moral disagreement? Solomon (2007: 206)  stated 
that emotions would be unintelligible if it were not for universal moral 
judgments that are irreducible to persuasions. However, due to the sub-
jectivism of Solomon’s account, universal moral judgments are still just a 
6  Empirical research in issues of nationalism and national identity (Pantic 1995, 
Kecamanovic 1999), verify this thesis. Societies that are in a deep social crisis are often 
followed by value regression which manifests itself twofold: internally, through sub-
jective disorientation as a consequence of demise of values, and externally as an absence 
of emotions that are important for maintaining a group cohesion. 
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psychological support for emotional judgments. Therefore, this universal-
ity is more like a communicability, i.e. it has the function of making the 
agent’s emotional judgments communicable. If the theory can somehow 
justify that these moral judgments are not just communicable but univer-
sal, then emotions (transitively) would be equivalent to values. The struc-
tural consequence of this equivalence would be the inter-reducibility of 
emotions and values in moral theories. 
I find that Martha Nussbaum’s account offers justification for the idea that 
emotions and values are equivalent. Nussbaum (2004: 190) argues that 
emotions are not reducible to emotional judgments; they are a part of each 
other identity. This conclusion is inferred from four premises (Nussbaum 
2004: 187–189): (1) the domain of an emotion has at least one object (the 
concept of “aboutness”); (2) the relation between emotion and object is 
intentional and it is linguistically expressed by propositional attitudes; (3) 
the emotions contain beliefs and perceptions about objects; (4) emotions 
bind objects and values together where emotional judgment has the role 
of the mediator. 
Premises (3) and (4) are inferred from (1) and (2). The difference  between 
these “groups of premises” is analytical, but very important. The first group 
of premises (1–2) are connected with authentic interpretation of objects 
by an agent. From the definition of intentionality, it follows that emotions 
have a crucial role in selecting objects that are important for an agent. 
Similar to Solomon’s account, Nussbaum seems to argue that emotions 
have both structural and semantic roles. The difference is that Nussbaum 
deprives emotions of the feature of world-structuring and limits them to 
object-selecting (via intentionality). This unties the normative function of 
emotions from psychological grounds. The second group of premises (3–4) 
are means of agents’ communication that are dependent on beliefs built 
within the first two premises. Nussbaum (2004: 189) argues that beliefs 
“are essential to the identity of the emotion” because they constitute the 
axis of disagreement between agents as well as the way to settle them. 
If premise (3) identifies the disagreement, premise (4) identifies that the 
nature of disagreement lies in values. It should be stressed that inter-reduc-
ibility of emotions and values cannot be inferred solely from connection be-
tween objects and values. What can be inferred is that value disagreement 
was triggered by emotions. There are two processes that need to be taken 
into account when explicating value disagreement. Firstly, emotions make 
intrinsic values of an object communicable by relating them to social val-
ues. This feature of the premise (4) is derived from premise (2). Secondly, 
during that process, emotions necessarily select some intrinsic values and 
rank them on the basis of the agent’s value system which does not need to 
be congruent with social values. This is derived from  premise (1). This sheds 
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light on a consequence that was not prima facie clear. Due to their evalua-
tive function, emotions have the power to make some objects more valuable 
than others by making them “ultimately finer and more discriminating than 
that made explicit in our earlier evaluative judgments” (Helm 2007: 228). 
Nussbaum (2004: 193) argues that in a social context where some sort of 
disagreement persists, the emotions are preceded by a more or less inten-
sive upheaval of the agent’s system of beliefs. This is connected to those 
emotional judgments that emotionally (re)select objects. The key change 
that Nussbaum brings to the discussion about emotional judgments is that 
this connection is not a necessary one.7 Nussbaum (2004: 194) finds that 
it is the natural language that is deceiving agents into believing that the 
connection is a necessary one since it is represented as a causal relation. It 
is plausible to imagine a context where a change is caused by disappear-
ance of an object, that an agent had a strong emotional reaction to it, but 
that his or her belief system stays sound.8 To test the authenticity of emo-
tions and the system of beliefs connected to them, Nussbaum (2004: 193) 
introduced the concept of upheaval: only when the emotion is strongly re-
lated to an upheaval, it is justified to argue that the agent is in a process 
of reevaluating his or her system of beliefs and harmonizing or conflicting 
it with a new social value system. 
The concept of upheaval is connected with emotions, but disagreement 
and its settling is a subject-matter of emotional judgment. This follows 
from premise (3), i.e. that the disagreement is always about agents’ be-
liefs. Emotional judgments have a normative addition which is not case 
with emotions. Albeit emotional judgments are a vital part of the identi-
ty of emotions, their form (propositional attitudes) limits the possibility 
that all features that are connected with the former are true for the lat-
ter, salva veritate. What is blocking the reduction is the agent’s need for 
a continuity of emotional relations in order to sanitize damage from the 
emotional upheaval. This implies that in some cases, beliefs are founded 
solely on the collective memory of an object that no longer exists (e.g. the 
7  Stevenson asserts a similar conclusion, stating that descriptive and emotional 
meaning are in “constant interplay” (1957: 72). He points to the case of the feelings 
of most Americans toward the democratic political system as an example (1957: 73). 
According to Stevenson, Americans have a recollection of what democracy is and that 
they maintain this set of attitudes via the laudatory meaning of democratic values. 
What is important is that this recollection is not necessarily in congruence with the 
factual state of American democracy, which can bring change to the laudatory meaning 
of democracy or the democratic system itself.
8  Example: The nostalgia for social benefits of the communist state is a common 
emotion in post-communist societies (Kecmanovic 2008: 76), and yet, as empirical 
evidence shows (Diamond 1999: 178–183) it does not necessarily relate negative 
values with democratic system.
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founding myths of a nation). But the converse can also be the case: one 
can have strong emotions about an object whose existence is an offence to 
all that society stands for, and still the normative order of the society can 
remain relatively solid (e.g. the case of representative democracy that re-
spects the rights of minorities to an authentic value system). For this rea-
son, the emotions and emotive judgments in Nussbaum’s account are im-
portant for each other’s identity, but this is not a logical type of identity. 
Reduction is false if all elements cannot be reduced to the same basis. In 
the case of emotions and emotional judgments, reducibility is impossible 
due to a strong network that exists between the latter and the normative 
order of the society. The existence of this network allows me to conclude 
that emotional judgments and values are inter-reducible. Emotional judg-
ments are knotted into the normative order of the society once the agents 
settle at least one of disagreements. Emotional judgments, therefore, have 
normative features. 
Concluding remarks: democratic values 
are emotional judgments
My analysis has shown that the plausible version of emotivism is the one 
consisting of the first pattern analysis that describes both the form and the 
meaning of moral terms in use, and the second part of the analysis that 
maps the network of emotional judgments that are to be used in the set-
tling of moral disagreements. This modified emotivism does not damage 
Stevenson’s basic idea that emotions are at the core of moral disagree-
ments. The advantage of the modified emotivism is that it determines the 
relations between emotions and values and finds that their overlapping 
point is emotive judgments, i.e. value inferences derived from proposi-
tional moral attitudes.
Is this modified emotivism verifiable? In order to answer the question, I 
need the context where disagreeing is a natural state for actors. As stated 
previously, this context is to be found in democracy. 
 It is a truism that political decisions in democracies are reached by a con-
sensus among all participating parties. What is contestable is the nature of 
this consensus, i.e. whether it is rational. One of the key points of  emoti vism 
is that purely rational conceptions of resolving moral disagreement are es-
sentially incompatible with the ways that actors actually behave, which is 
both rational and emotional. To put this differently, political decisions in 
democratic processes is value-oriented and, due to the emotional nature 
of values, partial.
The term “partiality” should be used somewhat cautiously because, in this 
case, its purpose is merely technical. Partiality here emphasizes the fact 
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that agents choose to use one cluster of values in democratic debates over 
an other, and that nature of this choice is often not rational. In his most 
recent book, Michael Freeden (2015: 87) argues that emotions play a vital 
role in agents’ ranking of the objects that they value the most and adjust 
them to the existing order of the social values. When partiality is compre-
hended as ranking, it becomes clear that this term is closely related to the 
concept of the freedom of choice as an inherently democratic value. In the 
context of democratic decision making, ranking is a purely political act. 
Therefore, it is true per definitionem that the emotional judgments that one 
uses to rank political objects are a political act as well. 
This enables me to conclude that values (at least political ones) are reduc-
ible to emotional judgments. That is to say that a political philosopher, when 
justifying political principles and decisions, needs to take into account both 
rational and emotional elements of actual (i.e. socially and culturally de-
pendent) behavior. As Margaret Gilbert (2014: 23–24) stressed, in order 
for an emotion to be a collective one, i.e. to be found as valuable by most, 
there must be a joint commitment of population P to be a body of emotion 
E; and for this commitment to be true, there must be sufficient reason for 
that. Since sufficient reasons for E are synonymous to justification for ac-
cepting E as a collective emotion, joint commitments can be defined as a 
“network of emotional judgments that forms the consensus.” 
Every political act, if it is to be morally justified and legitimately  recognized 
as intrinsically democratic one, it must be supported by an emotional judg-
ment. Since emotional judgments are to be accepted as collective emotions 
only when they contain sufficient reasons for those emotions, it follows 
that emotional judgments and values are inter-reducible. 
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Bojan Vranić
Demokratske vrednosti, emocije i emotivizam
Sažetak
Cilj rada je da istraži odnos između demokratskih vrednosti i emocija. Autor 
tvrdi da su demokratske vrednosti i emocije međusobno svodljivi: politički akteri 
služe se emocionalnim sudovima kako bi refleksivno ocenili normativne paradigme 
političkog života. U prvom delu rada, autor opisuje stanje u savremenoj političkoj 
filozofiji u vezi sa emocijama i identifikuje etičku koncepciju emotivizma Čarlsa 
Stivensona kao prvi celoviti pokušaj neutralne konceptualizacije emocija u 
moralnom i političkom mišljenju. Drugi deo rada istražuje nedostatke emotivizma 
i nalazi adekvatnu alternativu u konceptu emocionalnih sudova Marte Nusbaum, 
kao one koja uključuje verovanja o društvenim objektima i njihove vrednosti. U 
zaključnom delu rada, autor tvrdi da su moralni i politički sporovi u demokrati-
jama rezultat rangiranja političkih objekata po važnosti. Kriterijum evaluacije 
takvog tipa rangiranja je izveden is demokratskih vrednosti koje su svodljive na 
emocionalne sudove aktera.
Ključne reči: demokratija, emotivizam, emocionalni sudovi, moralni sporovi. 
